A Note on Scientific Essentialism, Laws of Nature, and Counterfactual Conditionals

Marc Lange

41 citations0/0 files storedAustralasian Journal of Philosophy

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Philosophy and History of Science Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy, Science, and History

Abstract

Scientific essentialism aims to account for the natural laws' special capacity to support counterfactuals. I argue that scientific essentialism can do so only by resorting to devices that are just as ad hoc as those that essentialists accuse Humean regularity theories of employing. I conclude by offering an account of the laws' distinctive relation to counterfactuals that portrays laws as contingent but nevertheless distinct from accidents by virtue of possessing a genuine variety of necessity.

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References

2017The Empirical Stance 2002Philosophy and our Mental Life 1992The World as One of a Kind: Natural Necessity and Laws of Nature

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2008Could the Laws of Nature Change?*2021A Powerful Particulars View of Causation 2005Lange on essentialism, counterfactuals, and explanation 2010Getting Away from Governance: A Structuralist Approach to Laws and Symmetries

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