A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism

Andrew E. Reisner

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

This paper shows that strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief is inconsistent with taking truth to be the source of normative reasons for belief. It does so by showing that there are circumstances in which one can know what truth requires one to believe, yet still lack evidence for the contents of that belief.

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References

2003How Truth Governs Belief 2002Belief's Own Ethics 2006A New Argument for Evidentialism 2018The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity 2005The Wrong Kind of Reason 2010The Domain of Reasons 2002The Aim Of Belief 2003Philosophical Perspectives

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2018Justifying the principle of indifference

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