Efficiency in partnerships

Patrick Legros · Hitoshi Matsushima

89 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Economic Theory

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Abstract

We provide the necessary and sufficient condition for a partnership to be able to sustain efficiency when the output is stochastic. When limited liability is imposed, we show that only the level of the average liability of the partnership is important; the individual levels of liability are irrelevant. However, the allocation of the total liability among the partners is crucial when additional conditions such as neutrality or individual rationality are imposed.

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References

1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization 1982Moral Hazard in Teams 1973Incentives in Teams 1979Incentives and incomplete information 1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 1980Incentives in Public Decision-Making.1986An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria 1947Foundations of a General Theory of Sequential Decision Functions

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2004Internal Competition for Corporate Resources and Incentives in Teams 1997Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring 2007Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus

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