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Efficiency in partnerships
11 references·3 citing·42 second hop
Efficiency in partnerships (1991)Efficiency in partnershipsTHE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION (2008)THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFE…Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Production, Information Costs…The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (1994)The Folk Theorem with Imperfe…Limit games and limit equilibria (1986)Limit games and limit equilib…An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria (1986)An Example of a Repeated Part…Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Moral Hazard in TeamsIncentives in Public Decision-Making. (1980)Incentives in Public Decision…Incentives in public decision-making (1980)Incentives in public decision…Incentives and incomplete information (1979)Incentives and incomplete inf…Incentives in Teams (1973)Incentives in TeamsFoundations of a General Theory of Sequential Decision Functions (1947)Foundations of a General Theo…Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus (2007)Individually rational, budget…Internal Competition for Corporate Resources and Incentives in Teams (2004)Internal Competition for Corp…Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring (1997)Efficiency in Partnerships wi…Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods (1977)Chapter 22 Social choice theory (1986)Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling (2001)Coalitional Power and Public Goods (2001)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology (1985)The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory (1986)Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games (1995)Topologies on Types (2005)Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete goods (2011)Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion (1979)Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring (1986)The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (1986)Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (1990)Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games (2005)But Who Will Monitor the Monitor? (2012)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal (1983)Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method (2005)An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015)Games and Decisions (2015)Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information (1984)On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria (1986)On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting (1988)A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem (2008)Formal Contracts in the Presence of Relational Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Technology Development Projects (2009)Cognitive systems for revenge and forgiveness (2012)First (?) Occurrence of Common Terms in Mathematical Statistics (1995)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)A/B Testing with Fat Tails (2020)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device (1986)Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives (1991)Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains (1979)MARKETS AND FREEDOMS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE MARKET MECHANISM IN PROMOTING INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS (1993)Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency (2001)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization9,565 cited
  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 1973Incentives in Teams3,334 cited
  • 1979Incentives and incomplete information795 cited
  • 1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information768 cited
  • 1980Incentives in Public Decision-Making.609 cited
  • 1986An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria167 cited
  • 1947Foundations of a General Theory of Sequential Decision Functions151 cited
  • 1980Incentives in public decision-making136 cited
  • 1986Limit games and limit equilibria107 cited
  • 2008THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION78 cited

Cited by

  • 2004Internal Competition for Corporate Resources and Incentives in Teams67 cited
  • 1997Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring50 cited
  • 2007Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus49 cited

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