The Structure of the Kernel of a Cooperative Game

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Previous article Next article The Structure of the Kernel of a Cooperative GameMichael Maschler and Bezalel PelegMichael Maschler and Bezalel Peleghttps://doi.org/10.1137/0115050PDFBibTexSections ToolsAdd to favoritesExport CitationTrack CitationsEmail SectionsAbout[1] Robert J. Aumann and , Michael Maschler, L. S. Shapley and , A. W. Tucker, The bargaining set for cooperative gamesAdvances in Game Theory, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N.J., 1964, 443–476, Annals of Mathematical Studies, No. 52 MR0176842 0132.14003 CrossrefGoogle Scholar[2] R. J. Aumann, , B. Peleg and , P. Rabinowitz, A method for computing the kernel of n-person games, Math. Comp., 19 (1965), 531–551 MR0198988 0133.43104 ISIGoogle Scholar[3A] Morton Davis and , Michael Maschler, Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games, Bull. Amer. Math. 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J., 1947xviii+641 MR0021298 Google Scholar Previous article Next article FiguresRelatedReferencesCited byDetails Shapley values and tolerance indices of the operators obtained with the Crescent MethodFuzzy Sets and Systems, Vol. 441 Cross Ref On the relationships between some games associated with SUOWA and Semi-SUOWA operatorsFuzzy Sets and Systems, Vol. 409 Cross Ref On the Relationship Between the Crescent Method and SUOWA OperatorsIEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, Vol. 28, No. 10 Cross Ref Networks and Stability21 August 2020 Cross Ref SUOWA operators: A review of the state of the art1 December 2018 | International Journal of Intelligent Systems, Vol. 34, No. 5 Cross Ref SUOWA operators: An analysis of their conjunctive/disjunctive characterFuzzy Sets and Systems, Vol. 357 Cross Ref Closed-form expressions for some indices of SUOWA operatorsInformation Fusion, Vol. 41 Cross Ref Construction of Choquet integrals through unimodal weighting vectors6 February 2018 | International Journal of Intelligent Systems, Vol. 33, No. 4 Cross Ref Coalitions15 February 2018 Cross Ref Networks and Stability31 May 2017 Cross Ref A Behavioral Analysis of WOWA and SUOWA Operators25 January 2016 | International Journal of Intelligent Systems, Vol. 31, No. 8 Cross Ref SUOWA operators: Constructing semi-uninorms and analyzing specific casesFuzzy Sets and Systems, Vol. 287 Cross Ref Constructing Choquet integral-based operators that generalize weighted means and OWA operatorsInformation Fusion, Vol. 23 Cross Ref A review on dependence graph in social reasoning mechanism16 November 2012 | Artificial Intelligence Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 Cross Ref On the Orness of SUOWA Operators18 June 2015 Cross Ref A Study of SUOWA Operators in Two DimensionsMathematical Problems in Engineering, Vol. 2015 Cross Ref Distributed games for coordinated coalition formation in femtocell networksComputer Networks, Vol. 73 Cross Ref Introduction15 August 2013 Cross Ref A Pre-Kernel Characterization and Orthogonal Projection19 August 2013 Cross Ref Characterization of the Pre-Kernel by Solution Sets19 August 2013 Cross Ref The partnered core of a game with side payments24 January 2012 | Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 39, No. 2-3 Cross Ref Networks and Stability Cross Ref The reactive bargaining set for cooperative games9 December 2009 | International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 39, No. 1-2 Cross Ref Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation gamesGames and Economic Behavior, Vol. 66, No. 1 Cross Ref Networks and Stability Cross Ref My joint work with Michael MaschlerGames and Economic Behavior, Vol. 64, No. 2 Cross Ref Coalitions12 December 2016 Cross Ref Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation GamesSSRN Electronic Journal Cross Ref Egoist's dilemma: a DEA gameOmega, Vol. 34, No. 2 Cross Ref An LP approach to compute the pre-kernel for cooperative gamesComputers & Operations Research, Vol. 33, No. 2 Cross Ref Consistency implies equal treatment in TU-gamesGames and Economic Behavior, Vol. 51, No. 1 Cross Ref A Further Extension of the KKMS TheoremMathematics of Operations Research, Vol. 25, No. 4 Cross Ref A Characterization of the Nucleolus for Convex GamesGames and Economic Behavior, Vol. 23, No. 1 Cross Ref An extension of the KKMS theoremJournal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 29, No. 2 Cross Ref The reactive bargaining set: Structure, dynamics and extension to NTU gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 26, No. 1 Cross Ref Credible Threats of Secession, Partnership, and Commonwealths Cross Ref Star-shapedness of the kernel for homogeneous gamesMathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 32, No. 3 Cross Ref The kernel/nucleolus of a standard tree gameInternational Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 25, No. 2 Cross Ref The Kernel of Homogeneous Games with Steps Cross Ref Games in Support Function Form: An Approach to the Kernel of NTU Games Cross Ref On the Reduced Game of Some Linear Production Games Cross Ref The kernel, the bargaining set and the reduced gameInternational Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 21, No. 1 Cross Ref Chapter 18 The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus Cross Ref A Survey of Consistency Properties in Cooperative Game TheoryTheo S. 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