Is the mind conscious, functional, or both?

Abstract

This 1990 BBS commentary will be mainly of interest to those who are studying the work of John Searle. It critically examines three of Searle’s proposals: (a) that cognitive functioning is not a definitive criterion of a mental state, (b) that the only definitive criterion of a “mental” state is its potential connection to consciousness, and (c) that there are no “deep unconscious states” that lack such a connection. The commentary argues that mental processes do not only have a potential connection to consciousness (as Searle maintains) or only permit us to function in certain ways (as functionalists would claim), but under certain circumstances achieve both. A science of the mind, therefore, could never be complete without addressing this duality.

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