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Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard
10 references·16 citing·41 second hop
Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard (1987)Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent O…The Theory of Economic Regulation (2021)The Theory of Economic Regula…Limited liability contracts between principal and agent (1983)Limited liability contracts b…Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship (1979)Risk Sharing and Incentives i…Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information (1979)Optimal incentive contracts w…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilitySome results on incentive contracts with applications to education and employment, health insurance, and law enforcement. (1978)Some results on incentive con…Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes (1978)Firm behavior under imperfect…Economic Analysis of Law (1974)Economic Analysis of LawInsurance, Information, and Individual Action (1971)Insurance, Information, and I…Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (1968)Crime and Punishment: An Econ…Valuing Food Safety And Nutrition (2019)Valuing Food Safety And Nutri…Inducing Environmental Disclosures: A Dynamic Mechanism Design Approach (2016)Inducing Environmental Disclo…Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons from Pollution, Safety, and Tax Settings (2014)Environmental Enforcement and…The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring (2012)The Role of Organizational Sc…Regulation Games Between Government and Competing Companies: Oil Spills and Other Disasters (2012)Regulation Games Between Gove…A 12-step process of white-collar crime (2009)A 12-step process of white-co…The Impact of Sanctions and Inspections on Firms' Environmental Compliance Decisions (2008)The Impact of Sanctions and I…Can Institutional Forces Create Competitive Advantage? An Empirical Examination of Environmental Innovation (2008)Can Institutional Forces Crea…Enforcement Principles and Environmental Agencies: Principal-Agent Relationships in a Delegated Environmental Program (2007)Enforcement Principles and En…Regulation of Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks (2006)Regulation of Health, Safety,…Public Enforcement of Law (2006)Public Enforcement of LawAgency Problems in Law Enforcement: Theory and Application to the U.S. Coast Guard (2005)Agency Problems in Law Enforc…The Use of Ambient Inspections in Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement When the Inspection Agency Cannot Commit Itself to Announced Inspection Probabilities (2002)The Use of Ambient Inspection…The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law (2001)The Shadow of the Rational Po…THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AND MANAGEMENT FRAUD: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (2001)THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENVI…Environmental “Citizen Suits” in the Czech Republic (2000)Environmental “Citizen Suits”…The Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. 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The Case of Electricity (1962)Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis (1972)Advertising as Information (1974)Adolescence-limited and life-course-persistent antisocial behavior: A developmental taxonomy. (1993)The Regulation of Entry (2000)The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century (2003)Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens (2014)Incentives and Prosocial Behavior (2006)The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins (2008)Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (2010)Chapter 2 The theory of the firm (1989)DOES MORE TRANSPARENCY GO ALONG WITH BETTER GOVERNANCE? (2006)The Evolution of Ethnocentrism (2006)Optimal Insurance Policy Indemnity Schedules (1983)Top management incentive compensation and knowledge sharing in multinational corporations (2008)Empirical evidence on the operational efficiency of National Oil Companies (2010)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1968Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach13,984 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 2021The Theory of Economic Regulation5,483 cited
  • 1974Economic Analysis of Law2,573 cited
  • 1979Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship1,285 cited
  • 1979Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information942 cited
  • 1971Insurance, Information, and Individual Action617 cited
  • 1983Limited liability contracts between principal and agent520 cited
  • 1978Some results on incentive contracts with applications to education and employment, health insurance, and law enforcement.333 cited
  • 1978Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes262 cited

Cited by

  • 2019Valuing Food Safety And Nutrition133 cited
  • 2001The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law84 cited
  • 2016Inducing Environmental Disclosures: A Dynamic Mechanism Design Approach66 cited
  • 2006Public Enforcement of Law56 cited
  • 2012The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring53 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

  • 2006Regulation of Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks40 cited
  • 2007Enforcement Principles and Environmental Agencies: Principal-Agent Relationships in a Delegated Environmental Program38 cited
  • 2012Regulation Games Between Government and Competing Companies: Oil Spills and Other Disasters38 cited
  • 2002The Use of Ambient Inspections in Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement When the Inspection Agency Cannot Commit Itself to Announced Inspection Probabilities38 cited
  • 2008The Impact of Sanctions and Inspections on Firms' Environmental Compliance Decisions31 cited
  • 2009A 12-step process of white-collar crime30 cited
  • 2008Can Institutional Forces Create Competitive Advantage? An Empirical Examination of Environmental Innovation29 cited
  • 2014Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons from Pollution, Safety, and Tax Settings29 cited
  • 2001THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AND MANAGEMENT FRAUD: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS27 cited
  • 2005Agency Problems in Law Enforcement: Theory and Application to the U.S. Coast Guard26 cited
  • 2000Environmental “Citizen Suits” in the Czech Republic13 cited