Does the Baseball Labor Market Contradict the Human Capital Model of Investment?

Asher Blass

85 citations0/0 files storedThe Review of Economics and Statistics

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Sports Analytics and Performance Labor market dynamics and wage inequality Merger and Competition Analysis

Abstract

This paper examines whether experienced players in Major League Baseball are paid more than their contribution to team revenue. The author shows that wages increase with experience independently of productivity gains. The results, therefore, contradict the human capital model of investment. The evidence is in fact consistent with implicit contract models because most older players are relatively overpaid. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.

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1979Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?1981Are Those Paid More Really More Productive? The Case of Experience

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