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ArticleBundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist

Alejandro M. Manelli2005

Article2005

Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist

Alejandro M. Manelli · Daniel R. Vincent

207 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Economic Theory

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Auction Theory and Applications Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing Game Theory and Voting Systems

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References

1981Optimal Auction Design 1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem 1989Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values 1998Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening 1996Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing 1999Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities 1988Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design 1984Bargaining under Asymmetric Information

Cited by

2016The Design and Price of Information 2003Haggling over substitutes 2017Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist 2013On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items 2015Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations 2011Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods 2017Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items

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2011Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goodsarticle · 5 shared references 2006Mixed bundling auctionsarticle · 5 shared references 2000Sequential Screeningarticle · 4 shared references 2007Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopolyarticle · 4 shared references 1999Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalitiesarticle · 4 shared references 2010The Economics of Multidimensional Screeningchapter · 4 shared references

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Year2005

Typearticle

Published2005-12-06

VenueJournal of Economic Theory

ISSN-L0022-0531

Languageen

Citations207

Files0 public / 0

ShelfAuction Theory and Applications

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doi10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.007

openalex_workW2013288181

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2013The menu-size complexity of auctions