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An Infinite-Horizon Model of Dynamic Membership of International Environmental Agreements
9 references·4 citing·38 second hop
An Infinite-Horizon Model of Dynamic Membership of International Environmental Agreements (2003)An Infinite-Horizon Model of Dynamic Memb…A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution (2006)A Core-Theoretic Solution for…Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control (2002)Transfers to sustain dynamic …Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction (2002)Time-consistent Shapley value…Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation (2001)Game Theory and International…Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers (1997)Non-cooperative models of coa…New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment (1997)New Directions in the Economi…A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution (1995)A core-theoretic solution for…Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements (1994)Self-Enforcing International …Strategies for the international protection of the environment (1993)Strategies for the internatio…COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY‐MAKING (2006)COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOB…Stable International Environmental Agreements with a Stock Pollutant, Uncertainty and Learning (2004)Stable International Environm…Russia: The Long Road to Ratification. Internal Institution and Pressure Groups in the Kyoto Protocol's Adoption Process (2004)Russia: The Long Road to Rati…Cities and Cultures (2004)Cities and CulturesThirteen plus one: a comparison of global climate policy architectures (2003)Applications Of Negotiation Theory To Water Issues (2005)Contracting with externalities and outside options (2005)Impure Public Goods and Technological Interdependencies (2005)The effect of climate change and extreme weather events on tourism (2005)LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., a Nevada corporation, Plaintiff, v. UKNOWN REGISTRANTS OF www.wn0000.com, www.wn1111.com, www.wn2222.com, www.wn3333.com, www.wn4444.com, www.wn5555.com, www.wn6666.com, www.wn7777.com, www.wn8888.com, www.wn9999.com, www.112211.com, www.4456888.com, www.4489888.com, www.001148.com, and www.2289888.com, Defendants. (2016)Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory (1982)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Stability and design of international environmental agreements: the case of transboundary pollution (2003)An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements (2007)Policies, instruments and co-operative agreements (2012)Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts (1987)Game Theory with Applications to Economics (1992)International cooperation for sale (2001)International environmental agreements among asymmetric nations (2006)The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (1986)Equilibrium Binding Agreements (1997)Carbon pricing in climate policy: seven reasons, complementary instruments, and political economy considerations (2017)Country-level social cost of carbon (2018)Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1945)Cores of convex games (1971)Dynamically Consistent Cooperative Solution in a Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution (2007)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods (1970)Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem (2003)Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium (2011)Global Public Goods: A Survey (2021)Carbon taxes: A drop in the ocean, or a drop that erodes the stone? The effect of carbon taxes on technological change (2005)A climate-change policy induced shift from innovations in carbon-energy production to carbon-energy savings (2006)Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game (2006)Coalitional Power and Public Goods (2001)Economic and environmental effectiveness of a technology-based climate protocol (2004)Regional versus global cooperation for climate control (2005)Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements (2006)Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges (2008)Dynamic Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution (2010)Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy (2015)Climate Change: The Ultimate Challenge for Economics (2019)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1994Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements1,668 cited
  • 1993Strategies for the international protection of the environment1,211 cited
  • 2001Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation366 cited
  • 2006A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution298 cited
  • 2002Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction290 cited
  • 1995A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution252 cited
  • 1997Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers191 cited
  • 2002Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control152 cited
  • 1997New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment117 cited

Cited by

  • 2004Russia: The Long Road to Ratification. Internal Institution and Pressure Groups in the Kyoto Protocol's Adoption Process92 cited
  • 2004Stable International Environmental Agreements with a Stock Pollutant, Uncertainty and Learning86 cited
  • 2006COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY‐MAKING85 cited
  • 2004Cities and Cultures19 cited

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