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Regional versus global cooperation for climate control · Study

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ArticleRegional versus global cooperation for climate control

Geir B. Asheim2005

Article2005

Regional versus global cooperation for climate control

Geir B. Asheim · Camilla Bretteville Froyn · Jon Hovi · Fredric C. Menz

162 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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Climate Change Policy and Economics Game Theory and Applications International Environmental Law and Policies

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References

1994Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements 1988On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting 1993Strategies for the international protection of the environment 1989Renegotiation in repeated games 1992International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions 2001Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation 1997The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements 1999A Theory of Full International Cooperation

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2015Social, Economic, and Ethical Concepts and Methods 2007Architectures for Agreement 2010Climate change in a public goods game: Investment decision in mitigation versus adaptation 2010Fair Air: Distributive Justice and Environmental Economics 2014Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations 2011Self-enforcing strategies to deter free-riding in the climate change mitigation game and other repeated public good games

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Year2005

Typearticle

Published2005-07-23

VenueJournal of Environmental Economics and Management

ISSN-L0095-0696

Languageen

Citations162

Files0 public / 0

ShelfClimate Change Policy and Economics

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doi10.1016/j.jeem.2005.04.004

openalex_workW2134550488

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2016Climate change mitigation: a role for climate clubs?

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