References

• 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
• 1983Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading2,512 cited
• 1967Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model2,152 cited
• 2004Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model2,127 cited
• 1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem1,983 cited
• 1968Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game1,059 cited
• 1968Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points988 cited
• 1988Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions895 cited
• 1983Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information670 cited
• 1985Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent586 cited
• 1990Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents412 cited
• 1988Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design281 cited
• 1984Bargaining under Asymmetric Information253 cited
• 1989The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms