Article1995

Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from U.S. States

Tamim Bayoumi · Morris Goldstein · Geoffrey R. Woglom

333 citations0/0 files storedJournal of money credit and banking

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Credit Risk and Financial Regulations Global Financial Crisis and Policies Fiscal Policies and Political Economy

Abstract

Tamim Bayoumi, Morris Goldstein, Geoffrey Woglom, Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from U.S. States, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 27, No. 4, Part 1 (Nov., 1995), pp. 1046-1059

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References

1981Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information 1976Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing

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