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Policy Boards and Policy Smoothing*

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References

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1986A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information1,287 cited
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1997Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths95 cited
1989Monetary Policy Games and Central Bank Politics90 cited
1996Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views64 cited
1997Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers46 cited
2004Central Bank Design in General Equilibrium33 cited
1987Reputational constraints on monetary policy a comment18 cited
1988Equilibrium Inflation as Determined by a Policy Committee11 cited

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2010Central bankers in government appointed committees10 cited

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2008Does Central Bank Independence Cause Low Inflation? A Sceptical View10 cited