I-Non-Inferential Knowledge

Marie McGinn

26 citations0/0 files storedProceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

This paper looks at statements I am in a position to make ‘straight off’: observational judgements, perceptual and memory statements, statements about my posture, my intentions, and so on. These kinds of statement pose a problem: what is the nature of my entitlement to them? I focus on observational judgements and on two contrasting approaches to them. The first, which I reject, provides an account of my warrant for them; the second, which I defend, disconnects my entitlement from possession of a justification. I consider what light the second approach sheds on the other kinds of statements I am in a position to make straight off.

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References

1994Mind and World 2004The Silence of the Senses 2002(Anti‐)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G.E. Moore and John McDowell*2010Tyler Burge on disjunctivism 2002Reading McDowell 2006McDowell and His Critics 2013Tyler Burge on disjunctivism (II)2008Comment on John McDowell's ‘The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument’

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