SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets
13 references·1 citing·43 second hop
Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets (2002)Signalling commitment with monetary and i…Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy With Unobservable Goals (2001)Transparency and Credibility:…Measuring the NAIRU: Evidence from Seven Economies (2001)Measuring the NAIRU: Evidence…Establishing a reputation for dependability by means of inflation targets (2000)Establishing a reputation for…Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy (1997)Reducing Inflation: Motivatio…Reducing Inflation (1997)Reducing InflationIMPORTING CREDIBILITY THROUGH EXCHANGE RATE PEGGING* (1997)IMPORTING CREDIBILITY THROUGH…Disciplined Discretion: Monetary Targeting in Germany and Switzerland (1997)Disciplined Discretion: Monet…How Precise are Estimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment? (1996)How Precise are Estimates of …Optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information (1991)Optimal accommodation by stro…SIGNALLING IN A MODEL OF MONETARY POLICY WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION * (1986)SIGNALLING IN A MODEL OF MONE…Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information (1986)Reputation in a model of mone…A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information (1986)A Theory of Ambiguity, Credib…Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information (1984)Monetary Policy Games and the…SIGNALING AND COMMITMENT: MONETARY VERSUS INFLATION TARGETING (2006)SIGNALING AND COMMITMENT: MON…Long-term contracting, sticky prices, and monetary policy (1977)Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule (1977)The Unstable EMS (1993)The Gold Standard as a “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval” (1996)A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model (1981)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy (1983)Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects (2000)Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling (2001)The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms (2001)Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans (1977)The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target (1985)Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)When does it take a Nixon to go to China? (1997)Chapter 22 Political economics and macroeconomic policy (1999)Imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound (2012)Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs. (1973)Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts (1980)A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model (1983)Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule (1999)Federal Reserve Information and the Behavior of Interest Rates (2000)Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is It Effective and, If So, How Does It Work? (2001)Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem (1986)The Role of Monetary Policy (1995)The Time-Varying NAIRU and its Implications for Economic Policy (1997)The Concept, Policy Use and Measurement of Structural Unemployment (2000)Robust Monetary Policy Rules with Unknown Natural Rates (2003)A time-varying “natural” rate of interest for the euro area (2007)Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Indicator Variables for Optimal Policy (2000)Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries (2005)Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness (2008)Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior (2002)The NAIRU in Theory and Practice (2002)The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics (2007)Oil Shocks and Aggregate Macroeconomic Behavior: The Role of Monetary Policy: A Comment (2004)Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy (2012)Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness (2002)Historical monetary policy analysis and the Taylor rule (2003)Tax structures in developing countries: Many puzzles and a possible explanation (2009)Reputational constraints on monetary policy (1987)Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (1988)An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy (2006)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1986A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information1,287 cited
  • 1986SIGNALLING IN A MODEL OF MONETARY POLICY WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION *551 cited
  • 1997Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy488 cited
  • 1984Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information440 cited
  • 2001Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy With Unobservable Goals428 cited
  • 1996How Precise are Estimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment?427 cited
  • 1997Reducing Inflation308 cited
  • 1986Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information289 cited
  • 2001Measuring the NAIRU: Evidence from Seven Economies207 cited
  • 1991Optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information101 cited
  • 2000Establishing a reputation for dependability by means of inflation targets48 cited
  • 1997Disciplined Discretion: Monetary Targeting in Germany and Switzerland35 cited
  • 1997IMPORTING CREDIBILITY THROUGH EXCHANGE RATE PEGGING*24 cited

Cited by

  • 2006SIGNALING AND COMMITMENT: MONETARY VERSUS INFLATION TARGETING10 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work