The Biology of Culpability:

Abstract

This article considers the impact of the new biological criminology on control strategies. Biocriminology does not purport to have a general explanation for crime, but draws upon contemporary human genetics and neurobiology to account for what is represented as a growing social problem of violent and anti-social conduct. Jurisprudential notions of free will and responsibility are not being displaced by genetic essentialism in the courtroom, where the tendency is for an increased emphasis upon moral responsibility of all offenders for their actions. However, in other areas of the criminal justice system, we are seeing the emergence of new conceptions of the individual `genetically at risk' of offending, and the development of crime prevention strategies based upon a rationale of public health. This is not a new eugenics, but a control strategy that aims to identify, treat and control individuals predisposed to impulsive or aggressive conduct. The implications of the new biological criminology may be seen in the form of genetic discrimination, genetic screening in risk assessments and the use of quasi-consensual `treatment' for supposed biological tendencies, as conditions for a non-custodial sentence, loss of employment or denial of insurance or other benefits. The search for biological dispositions may also play a part in the increased use of preventive detention and other pre-emptive interventions for `the protection of the public' against those whose conduct seems to show wanton disregard for the moral constraints on the conduct of free individuals in a liberal society.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 129 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.