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Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces†
8 references·16 citing·34 second hop
Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces† (1972)Sophisticated voting over multidimensiona…On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule (1973)On a Class of Equilibrium Con…Theory of voting (1969)Theory of votingNecessary and sufficient conditions for rational choice under majority decision (1969)Necessary and sufficient cond…The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem (1967)The General Irrelevance of th…A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule (1967)A Notion of Equilibrium and I…A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions (1966)A Possibility Theorem on Majo…The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)The Theory of Committees and …The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources (1943)The Interpretation of Voting …Minority Rights and Majority Power: Theoretical Consequences of the Motion to Recommit (2002)Minority Rights and Majority …A Problem with Referendums (2000)A Problem with ReferendumsParadoxes of Parties in Congress (1999)Paradoxes of Parties in Congr…SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, GAME THEORY, AND POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY (1998)SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, GAME TH…Testing Committee Composition Hypotheses for the U.S. Congress (1994)Testing Committee Composition…Committee Power, Structure-Induced Equilibria, and Roll Call Votes (1992)Committee Power, Structure-In…Sophisticated Voting in Congress: A Reconsideration (1990)Sophisticated Voting in Congr…Spatial Models of Legislative Choice (1988)Spatial Models of Legislative…The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget (1987)The Budget Process and the Si…Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting (1987)Sophisticated Voting and Agen…A group majority voting model of public good provision (1987)A group majority voting model…An Experimental Study of the Effects of Procedural Rules on Committee Behavior (1984)An Experimental Study of the …When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently? (1981)When Does Majority Rule Suppl…Structure-Induced Equilibria and Perfect-Foresight Expectations (1981)Structure-Induced Equilibria …Elections and Public Policy (1976)Elections and Public PolicyOn division of the question (1972)On division of the questionThe Pure Theory of Public Expenditure (1954)The Theory of Linear Economic Models (1962)Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions (1980)Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice (1981)Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence (1985)Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models (1979)Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties and the Vote (1979)Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. By Morris P. Fiorina. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981. Pp. xii + 249. $35.00, cloth; $9.95, paper.) (1982)A partisan model of government expenditure (2005)Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee (2016)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections (1994)Uncertainty in preference elicitation and aggregation (2007)Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains (2009)Etica & Politica - Ethics & Politics (2012)On the Rationale of Group Decision-making (1948)Pluralism and Social Choice (1983)Resource allocation and the public sector (1967)Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule (1978)Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union (2002)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement (1976)Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens (2014)Chapter 22 Social choice theory (1986)On 64%-Majority Rule (1988)The median voter model in public choice theory (1989)Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy (1979)Chapter 17 Contingent Valuation (2005)Contingent Valuation: A Practical Alternative when Prices Aren't Available (2012)The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition (1972)Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice (1986)Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization: Political Structure, Social Structure, and the Party Canvass (1992)Chapter 4 Voting procedures (2002)On The Robustness of Majority Rule (2008)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1959The Theory of Committees and Elections.2,822 cited
  • 1967A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule924 cited
  • 1969Theory of voting634 cited
  • 1943The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources601 cited
  • 1966A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions371 cited
  • 1973On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule341 cited
  • 1969Necessary and sufficient conditions for rational choice under majority decision245 cited
  • 1967The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem238 cited

Cited by

  • 1987The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget155 cited
  • 2000A Problem with Referendums139 cited
  • 1988Spatial Models of Legislative Choice128 cited
  • 1987Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting124 cited
  • 1972On division of the question116 cited
  • 1976Elections and Public Policy100 cited
  • 1987A group majority voting model of public good provision97 cited
  • 2002Minority Rights and Majority Power: Theoretical Consequences of the Motion to Recommit

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93 cited
  • 1994Testing Committee Composition Hypotheses for the U.S. Congress86 cited
  • 1984An Experimental Study of the Effects of Procedural Rules on Committee Behavior80 cited
  • 1992Committee Power, Structure-Induced Equilibria, and Roll Call Votes79 cited
  • 1999Paradoxes of Parties in Congress74 cited
  • 1998SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, GAME THEORY, AND POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY74 cited
  • 1981Structure-Induced Equilibria and Perfect-Foresight Expectations71 cited
  • 1981When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?68 cited
  • 1990Sophisticated Voting in Congress: A Reconsideration67 cited