Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric informationDavid A. Besanko, Anjan V. Thakor1987-06-01articleJournal of Economic Theory362 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Economic theories and modelsBanking stability, regulation, efficiencyCredit Risk and Financial RegulationsAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 362 citations exist upstream.References1981Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information1976Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing1977A model of insurance markets with incomplete information1987Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets1979Informational Equilibrium1983Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets1983Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal1987Efficient Signalling with Dividends and InvestmentsCited by1987Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information2010Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information2006Business collateral and personal commitments in SME lending2003Credit Ratings, Collateral, and Loan Characteristics: Implications for Yield*2015Government Credit, a Double-Edged Sword: Evidence from the China Development Bank2008Relationship lending and SME financing in the continental European bank-based system2010Tests of ex ante versus ex post theories of collateral using private and public information2009Deposit insurance and bank risk-taking: Evidence from internal loan ratings