In Search of a Human Science Psychology

Abstract

After a brief review of the diverse contributions of the pioneers Fechner, Wundt, and Titchener the unity of science hypothesis is considered and found to be inappropriate for psychology as a human science. The same applies to cybernetics and system theory, which are briefly reviewed. The realistic approach of Harre and Secord is an improvement on the positivist philosophies of science, but their view of man does not exclude the possibility of an advanced computer being considered human and is therefore vulnerable to technology. Support is given to the existential phenomenological approach and three salient questions for human scientific discourse are addressed, namely, the question of psychology's dialogue with psychotherapy, the question of truth as revealing ( Entbergung), and that of critical psychology. In general, it is stressed that a human science psychology should be adequate to man and should start with our primary experience as interpreted in the light of anthropological and phenomenological philosophies.

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