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An analysis of airport–airline vertical relationships with risk sharing contracts under asymmetric information structures
13 references·1 citing·40 second hop
An analysis of airport–airline vertical relationships with risk sharing contracts under asymmetric information structures (2014)An analysis of airport–airline vertical r…An analysis of an airport–airline relationship under a risk sharing contract (2012)An analysis of an airport–air…Revenue sharing with multiple airlines and airports (2010)Revenue sharing with multiple…The First-Best Sharing Rule in the Continuous-Time Principal–Agent Problem with Exponential Utility (1998)The First-Best Sharing Rule i…Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard (1998)Linear Contracts and the Doub…On optimal sharing rules in discrete-and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility (1997)On optimal sharing rules in d…Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts (1995)Double-Sided Moral Hazard and…Double Moral Hazard and Resale Price Maintenance (1994)Double Moral Hazard and Resal…The First-Order Approach to the Continuous-Time Principal–Agent Problem with Exponential Utility (1993)The First-Order Approach to t…Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market (1992)Equilibrium in a Reinsurance …Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Aggregation and Linearity in …The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems (1985)The First-Order Approach to P…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityEquilibrium in a Reinsurance Market (1962)Equilibrium in a Reinsurance …Stakeholder perceptions of the impacts of aviation subsidies in the South Pacific Region (2022)Stakeholder perceptions of th…Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy (1950)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)The theory of contracts (1987)Supplier-buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation (2001)Regulating Service Quality: A Survey (2005)The Economics of Franchising (2005)Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine (1953)Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy (1954)Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Market (1966)The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity (1978)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting (1987)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)A theory of contractual structure in agriculture (1985)Improving Channel Coordination Through Franchising (1990)Information, Contracting, and Quality Costs (2000)Finding the right mix: franchising, organizational learning, and chain performance (2001)Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements (1985)The Theory of Industrial Organization (1988)Theory of Industrial Organization. (1989)Will China’s airline industry survive the entry of high-speed rail? (2011)Airports and airlines economics and policy: An interpretive review of recent research (2012)Effects of high-speed rail and air transport competition on prices, profits and welfare (2012)Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous-time model (1971)BOT projects: Incentives and efficiency (2009)Joint Product Improvement by Client and Customer Support Center: The Role of Gain-Share Contracts in Coordination (2011)On the Performance of Linear Contracts (2011)Continuous‐Time Methods in Finance: A Review and an Assessment (2000)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem (2008)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives (1997)The Design of an Optimal Insurance Policy (1992)The Market for Catastrophe Risk: A Clinical Examination (1999)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
  • 1985The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems870 cited
  • 1962Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market700 cited
  • 1992Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market562 cited
  • 1995Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts537 cited
  • 1993The First-Order Approach to the Continuous-Time Principal–Agent Problem with Exponential Utility209 cited
  • 2010Revenue sharing with multiple airlines and airports127 cited
  • 1994Double Moral Hazard and Resale Price Maintenance124 cited
  • 1998Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard96 cited
  • 1997On optimal sharing rules in discrete-and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility54 cited
  • 1998The First-Best Sharing Rule in the Continuous-Time Principal–Agent Problem with Exponential Utility53 cited
  • 2012An analysis of an airport–airline relationship under a risk sharing contract36 cited

Cited by

  • 2022Stakeholder perceptions of the impacts of aviation subsidies in the South Pacific Region9 cited

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