Drafting the competition: Labor unions and military conscription

Abstract

This paper applies the interest‐group theory of government to the question of what determines the choice by a government to employ conscription as a recruiting device. We model the government's choice of the draft as a function of various potentially significant influences on that decision, including the extent of unionization of the labor force. We argue that unions may expect to benefit from the presence of conscription in much the same way as from a minimum wage rate — both are devices that tend to protect union‐members from low‐skilled, younger competitors. We find that, controlling for other influences, countries where union influence is greater are indeed more likely to employ the military draft.

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