VII?The Bayesian and the Dogmatist

Brian Weatherson

60 citations0/0 files storedProceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference

Abstract

It has been argued recently that dogmatism in epistemology is incompatible with Bayesianism. That is, it has been argued that dogmatism cannot be modelled using traditional techniques for Bayesian modelling. I argue that our response to this should not be to throw out dogmatism, but to develop better modelling techniques. I sketch a model for formal learning in which an agent can discover a posteriori fundamental epistemic connections. In this model, there is no formal objection to dogmatism.

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References

1937The General Theory of Employment 2000Knowledge and Its Limits 2002Knowledge and its Limits 1973A Treatise on Probability 1971Conclusive reasons 1974On Indeterminate Probabilities 2004Putting Logic in its Place 2003What Conditional Probability Could Not Be

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2018Imprecise Probability and the Measurement of Keynes's "Weight of Arguments"2019A Formal Account of Epistemic Defeat 2009On having no reason: dogmatism and Bayesian confirmation 2015Phenomenal Conservatism 2014Evidential Incomparability and the Principle of Indifference

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