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VII?The Bayesian and the Dogmatist
14 references·6 citing·39 second hop
VII?The Bayesian and the Dogmatist (2007)VII?The Bayesian and the DogmatistProblems for Dogmatism (2006)Problems for DogmatismWhy Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge (2005)Why Basic Knowledge is Easy K…Skepticism and the Vagaries of Justified Belief (2004)Skepticism and the Vagaries o…Putting Logic in its Place (2004)Putting Logic in its PlaceHow Hard Are the Sceptical Paradoxes? (2004)How Hard Are the Sceptical Pa…What Conditional Probability Could Not Be (2003)What Conditional Probability …Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Knowledge and its LimitsKeynes, uncertainty and interest rates (2002)Keynes, uncertainty and inter…Deeply Contingent A Priori Knowledge (2002)Deeply Contingent A Priori Kn…Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Knowledge and Its LimitsOn Indeterminate Probabilities (1974)On Indeterminate ProbabilitiesA Treatise on Probability (1973)A Treatise on ProbabilityConclusive reasons (1971)Conclusive reasonsThe General Theory of Employment (1937)The General Theory of Employm…A Formal Account of Epistemic Defeat (2019)A Formal Account of Epistemic…Imprecise Probability and the Measurement of Keynes's "Weight of Arguments" (2018)Imprecise Probability and the…Phenomenal Conservatism (2015)Phenomenal ConservatismEvidential Incomparability and the Principle of Indifference (2014)Evidential Incomparability an…Dragging and Confirming (2011)Dragging and ConfirmingOn having no reason: dogmatism and Bayesian confirmation (2009)On having no reason: dogmatis…Linguistics in Philosophy (1967)Speech Acts (1969)Reason, Truth and History (1981)Contemporary debates in epistemology (2005)Epistemic Luck (2005)Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. (1955)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic (2007)Experience and Evidence (2013)The Intellectual Given (2015)Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach (1990)Warrant: The Current Debate (1993)A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism (1998)Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction (2010)Belief, credence, and norms (2013)Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias (2015)Laws and symmetry (1989)Laws and Symmetry (1989)The Dappled World (1999)Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility (2006)The reference class problem is your problem too (2007)The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (2019)A ‘soft’ measure of consensus in the setting of partial (fuzzy) preferences (1988)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief (2012)The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Materialism (2009)Imagining as a Guide to Possibility (2010)Ideal rationality and logical omniscience (2015)Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. (1983)Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? (2000)Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (2004)Does the Stock Market Overreact? (1985)Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets (1990)Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in the Stock Market (2007)Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism (2007)Grounding in the image of causation (2015)Structural representation and surrogative reasoning (1991)Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification (1994)Speaking My Mind (2004)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1937The General Theory of Employment5,168 cited
  • 2000Knowledge and Its Limits5,056 cited
  • 2002Knowledge and its Limits2,789 cited
  • 1973A Treatise on Probability2,575 cited
  • 1971Conclusive reasons563 cited
  • 1974On Indeterminate Probabilities547 cited
  • 2004Putting Logic in its Place469 cited
  • 2003What Conditional Probability Could Not Be427 cited
  • 2006Problems for Dogmatism268 cited
  • 2002Deeply Contingent A Priori Knowledge204 cited
  • 2005Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge152 cited
  • 2004How Hard Are the Sceptical Paradoxes?118 cited
  • 2002Keynes, uncertainty and interest rates75 cited
  • 2004Skepticism and the Vagaries of Justified Belief74 cited

Cited by

  • 2018Imprecise Probability and the Measurement of Keynes's "Weight of Arguments"30 cited
  • 2019A Formal Account of Epistemic Defeat30 cited
  • 2009On having no reason: dogmatism and Bayesian confirmation

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28 cited
  • 2015Phenomenal Conservatism26 cited
  • 2014Evidential Incomparability and the Principle of Indifference23 cited
  • 2011Dragging and Confirming21 cited