In Honor of Elinor “Lin” Ostrom: The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Department of Political Science, Indiana University

James M. Walker · Mark Isaac

22 citations0/0 files storedExperimental Economics

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Economic Theory and Institutions Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

Numerous tributes to Elinor (Lin) Ostrom have appeared across a wide spectrum of academic and non-academic venues (e.g., see citations to tributes listed in the references).Certainly, Lin's academic accomplishments are much too long and too broad for us to begin to adequately capture here.Needless to say, in addition to her path-breaking research, Lin's career as an advocate for research examining issues of collective action included many honors, including becoming the first woman to win the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences.In addition, Lin's career included numerous elected offices, including serving as the president of the American Political Science Association, the Public Choice Society, and the International Association for the Study of the Commons.In this special issue of Experimental Economics, we wish to highlight two of Lin's particular accomplishments, her choice to embrace experimental methods as central to the study of collective action and her leadership in creating the biennial conference on social dilemmas that became the impetus for this special issue.In the 1981-1982 academic year, Vincent and Lin Ostrom were invited to participate in a year-long interdisciplinary program at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research at Bielefeld University in Germany on ''Guidance, Control, and Performance Evaluation in the Public Sector.''Their time at Bielefeld provided them the opportunity to interact with leading scholars working in the areas of game theory and experimental methods.Already a pioneer in studying collective action and governance of the commons, at a stage in her career when many researchers are set in their intellectual outlooks, Lin began to plan a new research agenda, namely

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1994Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources 2010A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 1992Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible 2010Lab Experiments for the Study of Social-Ecological Systems 1990The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems 1990Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence 2000Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes 2013Provision versus Appropriation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Social Dilemmas

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