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In Honor of Elinor “Lin” Ostrom: The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Department of Political Science, Indiana University
9 references·2 citing·39 second hop
In Honor of Elinor “Lin” Ostrom: The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Department of Political Science, Indiana University (2014)In Honor of Elinor “Lin” Ostrom: The Vinc…Provision versus Appropriation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Social Dilemmas (2013)Provision versus Appropriatio…Lab Experiments for the Study of Social-Ecological Systems (2010)Lab Experiments for the Study…A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)A Behavioral Approach to the …Communication and Co-operation in a Common-Pool Resource Dilemma: A Field Experiment (2004)Communication and Co-operatio…Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes (2000)Collective Choice in the Comm…Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (1994)Rules, Games, and Common-Pool…Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible (1992)Covenants with and without a …The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems (1990)The Nature of Common-Pool Res…Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence (1990)Rent dissipation in a limited…Experimental guidance for eliciting beliefs with the Stochastic Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism (2018)Experimental guidance for eli…Probabilistic Choice and Optimal Contracts (2016)Probabilistic Choice and Opti…The Selfish Gene (1976)An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining (1982)ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition (2000)TURFS in the lab: Institutional Innovation in Real-Time Dynamic Spatial Commons (2008)Communication and collective action: language and the evolution of human cooperation (2010)Local response to global uncertainty: Insights from experimental economics in small-scale fisheries (2017)Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (1988)Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (1992)The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods (1996)Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution (2003)Private and Common Property Rights (2007)Fiscal Governance in Europe (2009)Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History (1995)A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation (1999)Allocating a voluntarily provided common-property resource: An experimental examination (2014)Doing good or doing harm: experimental evidence on giving and taking in public good games (2014)Status quo effects in fairness games: reciprocal responses to acts of commission versus acts of omission (2016)Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments (2000)Antisocial Punishment Across Societies (2008)Crafting analytical tools to study institutional change (2010)Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans (2011)The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games (2011)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. (1966)The Role of Communication in Resolving Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators (1994)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1987)Governing the Commons (1990)Altruistic punishment in humans (2002)Measuring utility by a single-response sequential method (1964)Measuring Utility by a Single-Response Sequential Method (1964) (1974)Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects (2002)The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I (1964)The Evolution of Cooperation (1981)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms (2000)Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (2010)The Danger of Self-Evident Truths (2000)Do institutions for collective action evolve? (2013)Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: A sketch of the evidence (2014)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1994Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources3,840 cited
  • 2010A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 19972,850 cited
  • 1992Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible2,064 cited
  • 2010Lab Experiments for the Study of Social-Ecological Systems347 cited
  • 1990The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems324 cited
  • 1990Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence221 cited
  • 2000Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes217 cited
  • 2013Provision versus Appropriation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Social Dilemmas91 cited
  • 2004Communication and Co-operation in a Common-Pool Resource Dilemma: A Field Experiment54 cited

Cited by

  • 2018Experimental guidance for eliciting beliefs with the Stochastic Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism19 cited
  • 2016Probabilistic Choice and Optimal Contracts0 cited

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