Article1994

A Note on the Extension of J. M. Keynes' Decision Theory

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Leadership, Behavior, and Decision-Making Studies

Abstract

It is a simple and straightforward matter to adjust the weights used in Keynes' decision theory to model risk and ambiguity aversion also to model preference for risk and ambiguity. Once these modifications are made, Keynes' theory is complete, as it covers all possible cases.

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1993J. M. Keynes's Theoretical Approach to Decision-making Under Conditions of Risk and Uncertainty 1989Dynamics of Choice Behavior: The Logical Relation between Linear Objective Probability and Nonlinear Subjective Probability 1989Is There an Ellsberg-Fellner Paradox? A Note on its Resolution 1989Is There an Allais Paradox? A Note on its Resolution 1991THEORETICAL COMPARISON OF THE DECISION THEORIES OF J. M. KEYNES, KAHNEMAN-TVERSKY, AND EINHORN-HOGARTH

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1994Comments on M. E. Brady's Extension to J. M. Keynes' Decision Rule

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