Articlegreen1991

THEORETICAL COMPARISON OF THE DECISION THEORIES OF J. M. KEYNES, KAHNEMAN-TVERSKY, AND EINHORN-HOGARTH

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Leadership, Behavior, and Decision-Making Studies

Abstract

It is demonstrated that J. M. Keynes in 1921 provided a complete decision rule that handles both the cases of nonlinear probability preferences and ambiguity or uncertainty. The 1979 Kahneman-Tversky approach deals only with risk (nonlinear probability preferences) and does not specify a decision rule. The 1985–1986 Einhorn-Hogarth anchoring and adjustment rule deals only with ambiguity or uncertainty and not risk. Only Keynes' rule does both.

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1979Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk 1961Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms 1959The Logic of Scientific Discovery.1985Ambiguity and uncertainty in probabilistic inference.1986Decision Making Under Ambiguity 1989Dynamics of Choice Behavior: The Logical Relation between Linear Objective Probability and Nonlinear Subjective Probability 1989Is There an Ellsberg-Fellner Paradox? A Note on its Resolution 1989Is There an Allais Paradox? A Note on its Resolution

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1994A Note on the Extension of J. M. Keynes' Decision Theory 1994J. M. Keynes' Decision Theory, a Technical Note

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