WITHIN-TEAM COMPETITION IN THE MINIMUM EFFORT COORDINATION GAME

Enrique Fatás · Tibor M. Neugebauer · Javier Perote

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

Abstract. We report the results of an experiment on a continuous version of the minimum effort coordination game. The introduction of within-team competition significantly increases effort levels relative to a baseline with no competition and increases coordination relative to a secure treatment where the pay-off-dominant equilibrium strategy weakly dominates all other actions. Nonetheless, within-team competition does not prevent subjects from polarizing both in the efficient and the inefficient equilibria.

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