Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures

Daniel A. Diermeier · Roger B. Myerson

251 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Economic Review

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Abstract

Theories of organization of legislatures have mainly focused on the U.S. Congress, explaining why committee systems emerge there, but not explaining variance in organization across legislatures of different countries. To analyze the effects of different constitutional features on the internal organization of legislatures, we adopt a vote-buying model and consider the incentives to delegate decision rights in a game among legislative chambers. We show how presidential veto power and bicameral separation can encourage a legislative chamber to create internal veto players or supermajority rules, while a unicameral structure can encourage legislators to delegate power to a leader. (JEL D72)

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References

1988The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets 1979Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models 1981Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice 1987Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures 1900The English constitution 1996Buying Supermajorities 1988The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England

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