Salesforce Compensation Plans in Environments with Asymmetric Information

Rajiv Lal · Richard Staelin

174 citations0/0 files storedMarketing Science

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a theory of salesforce compensation plans to provide insights into why it may be advantageous for a profit maximizing firm to offer members of its salesforce the opportunity to choose from a menu of compensation plans. Although such contractual arrangements are not commonly used in the industry, they have been introduced and implemented by firms such as IBM and St. Regis Paper. As in our previous work on salesforce compensation plans (Basu, Lal, Srinivasan, and Staelin [Basu, A. K., R. Lal, V. Srinivasan, R. Staelin. 1985. Salesforce compensation plans: An agency theoretic perspective. Marketing Sci. 4 (Fall) 267–291.]) we use an agency-theory framework. In this paper, we relax the assumptions of information symmetry and salesforce homogeneity and show the conditions under which it is optimal to offer a menu of compensation plans. We also show that even when these assumptions are relaxed there are situations where offering a single plan characterized by Basu, Lal, Srinivasan, and Staelin (Basu, A. K., R. Lal, V. Srinivasan, R. Staelin. 1985. Salesforce compensation plans: An agency theoretic perspective. Marketing Sci. 4 (Fall) 267–291.) is still optimal. Insights gained from the analyses are discussed in the context of an existing compensation scheme.

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References

1979Moral Hazard and Observability 1982Moral Hazard in Teams 1979Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts 1983A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts 2008An Industry Equilibrium Analysis of Downstream Vertical Integration 1985The Salesperson as Outside Agent or Employee: A Transaction Cost Analysis 1984Market Segmentation, Self-Selection, and Product Line Design 1985Salesforce Compensation Plans: An Agency Theoretic Perspective

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