Making global markets: Historical institutionalism in international political economy

Abstract

As dramatically evidenced by the global financial crisis, the interaction of domestic regulatory systems has significant international consequences. Nevertheless, these relationships have received only limited attention from international relations scholars. This special issue, therefore, provides a detailed examination of international market regulation – the processes through which the domestic regulatory activities of states and other actors set the effective rules of internationally-exposed markets. To this end, we borrow and extend on arguments developed by historical institutionalists in comparative politics and American political development. In particular, the contributions adapt two mechanisms – policy feedbacks and relative sequencing – to explain state and bureaucratic preferences over international market regulation as well as bargaining strength in relevant negotiations. In addition to contributing to central IPE debates about international economic governance, the individual contributions shed light on a number of important empirical domains such as corporate accounting, intellectual property, pharmaceuticals, hedge funds, and financial market standardization.

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