International interdependence and regulatory power: Authority, mobility, and markets

Abstract

This article revisits a fundamental question of international political economy: when does cross-border economic interdependence become a source of power. The view that economic interdependence is a source of potential power, not just mutual benefits, has a long lineage traceable to political realism, organizational economics, Ricardian trade theory, and structural Marxism, and researchers typically focus on preferred causal variables in isolation. Despite important contributions, little attention has been paid to understanding the interactions of multiple perspectives on asymmetric interdependence, or to making sense of contradictory expectations of the various models. As a consequence scholars engaged in globalization debates, such as those about policy convergence or private actor governance, frequently talk past one another. To deduce expectations about the relationship between power and interdependence, we build a model synthesizing standard approaches that analyze the effects of market size and market scope separately, and then add the critical variable of jurisdictional boundaries. By decoupling geography and authority, our analysis produces a respecification of classic interdependence models and advances core international political economy debates concerning power dynamics in a globalized economy.

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