RESTRICTED VOTING SHARES, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF DUAL‐CLASS FIRMS

Abstract

Abstract In this study, financial implications of differential voting right/multiple ordinary share class capitalizations are examined using data from British dual‐class firms. Positive wealth effects are observed after announcements of plans to issue restricted voting (RV) shares, and also after announcements of RV share enfranchisement plans. The two share classes are usually created through large, noncash stock dividends or recapitalizations and, although corporate insiders hold about three times as large a fraction of superior voting (SV) shares, their RV shareholdings average a nontrivial 10.1 percent. Finally, compensation is usually paid to SV shareholders when RV shares are enfranchised.

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