this work references cited by second hopReferences
- 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
- 1983Separation of Ownership and Control19,446 cited
- 1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm10,540 cited
- 1977INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION4,056 cited
- 1977Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation3,772 cited
- 1980Measuring security price performance3,330 cited
- 1988Managerial control of voting rights2,441 cited
- 1988One share-one vote and the market for corporate control1,342 cited
- 1988Corporate governance670 cited
- 1985Managerial ownership of voting rights659 cited
- 1982Signaling and the Valuation of Unseasoned New Issues401 cited
- 1983The market value of control in publicly-traded corporations359 cited
- 1983Voting in Corporate Law334 cited
- 1984Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance326 cited
- 1988Dual-class recapitalizations as antitakeover mechanisms235 cited
- 1983Economic Evaluation of Voting Power of Common Stock
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