SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
10 references·7 citing·25 second hop
Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures (1977)Characterization of domains admitting non…The Theory of Social Choice (2015)The Theory of Social ChoiceAxiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation (1976)Axiomatic Social Choice Theor…Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Strategy-proofness and Arrow'…Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Manipulation of Voting Scheme…Collective Choice and Social Welfare. (1972)Collective Choice and Social …Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1972)Collective Choice and Social …Necessary and sufficient conditions for rational choice under majority decision (1969)Necessary and sufficient cond…Social Choice and Individual Values. (1953)Social Choice and Individual …Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Social Choice and Individual …The Decisions of a Committee Using a Special Majority (1948)The Decisions of a Committee …Arrow’s theorem and theory choice (2013)Arrow’s theorem and theory ch…Mechanism design on discrete lines and cycles (2012)Mechanism design on discrete …A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one (2012)A sufficient condition for th…Strategyproof Social Choice (2011)Strategyproof Social ChoiceConnecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems (1998)Connecting and resolving Sen'…Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods (1991)Impossibility of Strategy-Pro…Social welfare functions when preferences are convex, strictly monotonic, and continuous (1979)Social welfare functions when…On the Rationale of Group Decision-making (1948)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)Chapter 4 Voting procedures (2002)On The Robustness of Majority Rule (2008)Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination (1977)On a Class of Poverty Measures (1980)On the Methodological Framework of Composite Indices: A Review of the Issues of Weighting, Aggregation, and Robustness (2018)A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions (1978)Chapter 22 Social choice theory (1986)Democracy Defended (2003)Human Rights and Capabilities (2005)Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens (2014)A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS? (1991)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Well-being : the foundations of hedonic psychology (1999)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Condorcet Social Choice Functions (1977)Poverty and famines an essay on entitlement and deprivation (1981)The Income Component of the Human Development Index (2000)Effects of Public Opinion on Policy (1983)Political Institutions (2001)Voting on Majority Rules (2003)Knapsack Voting for Participatory Budgeting (2019)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1951Social Choice and Individual Values.7,792 cited
  • 1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result3,211 cited
  • 1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions2,821 cited
  • 1972Collective Choice and Social Welfare2,565 cited
  • 1953Social Choice and Individual Values.1,534 cited
  • 2015The Theory of Social Choice700 cited
  • 1972Collective Choice and Social Welfare.656 cited
  • 1976Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation274 cited
  • 1969Necessary and sufficient conditions for rational choice under majority decision245 cited
  • 1948The Decisions of a Committee Using a Special Majority137 cited

Cited by

  • 2011Strategyproof Social Choice100 cited
  • 1979Social welfare functions when preferences are convex, strictly monotonic, and continuous92 cited
  • 1991Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods89 cited
  • 2012A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one79 cited
  • 1998Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

69 cited
  • 2012Mechanism design on discrete lines and cycles68 cited
  • 2013Arrow’s theorem and theory choice9 cited