On Two Alleged Conflicts Between Divine Attributes

Abstract

Some argue that God's omnipotence and moral perfection prevent God from being afraid and having evil desires and thus from understanding such states---which contradicts God's omniscience. But, I argue, God could acquire such understanding indirectly, either by (i) perceiving the mental states of imperfect creatures, (ii) imaginatively combining the components of mental states with which God could be acquainted, or (iii) having false memory traces of such states. (i)--(iii) are consistent with the principal divine attributes. I wish to discuss two anti-theistic arguments, both of which use seemingly plausible empiricist principles to establish a conflict between divine attributes. One of the arguments, due to David Blumenfeld (1978), runs roughly as follows. An omniscient being would understand all concepts and all the facts of human psychology. But understanding fear, frustration, and despair requires having (at some time) mental states that no omnipotent and omniscient being could h...

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