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Cooperation in a fixed-membership labor-managed enterprise
14 references·2 citing·37 second hop
Cooperation in a fixed-membership labor-managed enterprise (1982)Cooperation in a fixed-membership labor-m…Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality (1999)Nash Equilibrium and Welfare …On the 'Employment' Decision of a Labour-Managed Firm (1982)On the 'Employment' Decision …Efficiency, incentives, and individual labor supply in the labor-managed firm (1981)Efficiency, incentives, and i…Incentives in Public Decision-Making. (1980)Incentives in Public Decision…Incentives in public decision-making (1980)Incentives in public decision…Collectives, communes, and incentives (1980)Collectives, communes, and in…Incentives, income sharing, and institutional innovation in the yugoslav self-managed firm (1979)Incentives, income sharing, a…Efficient Collective Choice when Compensation is Possible (1979)Efficient Collective Choice w…Cost, Revenue, and Profit Functions (1978)Cost, Revenue, and Profit Fun…The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism (1977)The Firm in Illyria: Market S…Short-run efficiency in the labor-managed firm (1977)Short-run efficiency in the l…The Theory of Labour-Managed Firms and of Profit Sharing (1972)The Theory of Labour-Managed …The General Theory of Labor-Managed Market Economies. (1972)The General Theory of Labor-M…Labour Allocation in a Cooperative Enterprise (1966)Labour Allocation in a Cooper…Some Aspects of Linked Product and Credit Market Contracts Among Risk‐Neutral Agents (1991)Some Aspects of Linked Produc…Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships (1991)Contracts With Eviction in In…Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods (1977)Chapter 22 Social choice theory (1986)Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling (2001)Coalitional Power and Public Goods (2001)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure (1954)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)THEORETICAL PROGRESS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS: A PROVOCATIVE ASSESSMENT (1990)The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont (2009)Game Theory, Alive (2017)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)Contracts as Reference Points * (2008)Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare (2008)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development (1991)Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organization: Methodological Remarks for Development Economics (1991)Three Methods to Share Joint Costs or Surplus (1999)The Economics of Control (1944)The Soviet collective farm as a producer cooperative (1989)Market, State, and Community (1990)Governing the Firm (2003)The Theory of the Cost-of-Living Index and the Measurement of Welfare Change (1990)Density and Integration Effects on Class I U.S. Freight Railroads (2001)Driving forces for consolidation or fragmentation of the US water utility industry: A cost function approach with endogenous output (2005)Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains (1979)MARKETS AND FREEDOMS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE MARKET MECHANISM IN PROMOTING INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS (1993)Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency (2001)Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability (1980)The organization of work a comparative institutional assessment (1980)Theoretical and Empirical Studies of Producer Cooperatives: Will Ever the Twain Meet? (1993)Valuing Freedoms (2002)Linking Conflict to Inequality and Polarization (2011)Ethnicity and Conflict: An Empirical Study (2012)Conceptual Dimensions and Boundaries of Participation in Organizations: A Critical Evaluation (1978)A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm (1984)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1999Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality1,182 cited
  • 1977The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism743 cited
  • 1980Incentives in Public Decision-Making.609 cited
  • 1972The General Theory of Labor-Managed Market Economies.577 cited
  • 1972The Theory of Labour-Managed Firms and of Profit Sharing493 cited
  • 1966Labour Allocation in a Cooperative Enterprise331 cited
  • 1978Cost, Revenue, and Profit Functions218 cited
  • 1980Incentives in public decision-making136 cited
  • 1980Collectives, communes, and incentives77 cited
  • 1979Efficient Collective Choice when Compensation is Possible77 cited
  • 1981Efficiency, incentives, and individual labor supply in the labor-managed firm56 cited
  • 1977Short-run efficiency in the labor-managed firm45 cited
  • 1982On the 'Employment' Decision of a Labour-Managed Firm41 cited
  • 1979Incentives, income sharing, and institutional innovation in the yugoslav self-managed firm35 cited

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  • 1991Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships37 cited
  • 1991

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Some Aspects of Linked Product and Credit Market Contracts Among Risk‐Neutral Agents
17 cited