Econometric modelling of UK executive compensation

Martin J. Conyon · Simon I. Peck

28 citations0/0 files storedManagerial Finance

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Corporate Finance and Governance Accounting and Organizational Management Corporate Governance and Financial Management

Abstract

Looks briefly at theories underlying the correlation between company performance and executive compensation, develops a mathematical model and applies it to results which show a significant positive link between the highest paid director’s compensation and total shareholder returns, but not with earnings per share. Considers consistency with other research, notes the influence of company size on executive pay and calls for further research on this important issue of corporate governance.

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1991Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations 1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives 1996Competition and Corporate Performance 1985Corporate performance and managerial remuneration 1999Executive Compensation 1993Accounting earnings and top executive compensation 1998BOARD CONTROL, REMUNERATION COMMITTEES, AND TOP MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION.1996Total Board Remuneration and Company Performance

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2013Gentlemen do not talk about money: Remuneration dispersion and firm performance relationship on British boards

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