Cover-up and Collective Integrity: On the Natural Antagonisms of Authority Internal and External to Organizations

Abstract

This paper traces the roots of organizational cover-up to the sources of collective integrity. It develops a perspective on tensions between the vitality of authority within organizations and the penetration of moral authority respresenting the external society. In the white-collar ranks of formal organizations, persons construct authority to govern internal relations by shielding members from external scrutiny and by declining to force members to accept their responsibilities according to externally defined norms. Accepting these practices as proper, external authorities recognize the legitimacy of a collectivity's moral autonomy. I examine several forms of shielding and non-enforcement practices, noting each for each: how it builds authority to integrate the collectivity by weakening the penetration of external authority; uses of the method routinely accepted as legitimate by external authority; and how members may drift from legitimate uses to illegitimate “cover-ups.” I also discuss some implications for the study of white-collar deviance and the experience of complicity in occupational life.

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