A Nonconformist Account of the Asch Experiments: Values, Pragmatics, and Moral Dilemmas

Abstract

This article offers a new approach to Asch's (1956) influential studies relating physical and social perception. Drawing on research on values, conversational pragmatics, cross-cultural comparisons, and negotiation, the authors challenge the normative assumptions that have led psychologists to interpret the studies in terms of conformity. A values-pragmatics account is offered that suggests that participants attempt to realize multiple values (e.g., truth, social solidarity) in an inherently frustrating situation by tacitly varying patterns of dissent and agreement to communicate larger scale truths and cooperative intentions. Alternative theories (e.g., embarrassment, attribution) are compared and empirical implications of the values-pragmatics account are evaluated. The possibility of multiple strategies promoting group survival and the proper role of moral evaluation in social psychological research are considered.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 120 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.