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DRG prospective payment systems: refine or not refine?
16 references·0 citing·42 second hop
DRG prospective payment systems: refine or not refine? (2009)DRG prospective payment systems: refine o…Incentive-compatible guaranteed renewable health insurance premiums (2006)Incentive-compatible guarante…Purchasing health care services from providers with unknown altruism (2004)Purchasing health care servic…Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment (2004)Multitasking and mixed system…Cream-skimming, incentives for efficiency and payment system (2003)Cream-skimming, incentives fo…Handbook of Health Economics (2001)Handbook of Health EconomicsHospital response to DRG refinements: the impact of multiple reimbursement incentives on inpatient length of stay (2000)Hospital response to DRG refi…Chapter 15 Government purchasing of health services (2000)Chapter 15 Government purchas…Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins (1998)Creaming, skimping and dumpin…Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality (1998)Contracting for Health Servic…Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality (1998)Contracting for health servic…Hospital Reimbursement Incentives: An Empirical Analysis (1997)Hospital Reimbursement Incent…H ealth C are P ayment S ystems : C ost and Q uality I ncentives (1994)H ealth C are P ayment S yste…Optimal payment systems for health services (1990)Optimal payment systems for h…Hospital nonprice competition and medicare reimbursement policy (1989)Hospital nonprice competition…Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement (1986)Provider behavior under prosp…A Theory of Yardstick Competition (1985)A Theory of Yardstick Competi…TOWARD A THEORY OF NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS: AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF A HOSPITAL (1969)Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship (1979)Doctors and Their Workshops (1980)Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production versus Selection (1996)Chapter 11 The anatomy of health insurance (2000)Physician Agency (2000)The Bargaining Problem (1950)Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)Incentives and provider payment methods (1995)Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships (1995)UNCERTAINTY AND THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL CARE (2003)How payment systems affect physicians’ provision behaviour—An experimental investigation (2011)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy (2003)Hospital Competition and Quality with Regulated Prices* (2011)Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives (1970)Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)The Anatomy of Health Insurance (1999)Chapter 14 Risk adjustment in competitive health plan markets (2000)Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement (1992)The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)Options for Slowing the Growth of Health Care Costs (2008)Physicians’ multitasking and incentives: Empirical evidence from a natural experiment (2008)The Effects of Introducing Mixed Payment Systems for Physicians: Experimental Evidence (2015)Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (1995)The Handbook of experimental economics (1995)Chapter 27 Antitrust and competition in health care markets (2000)Patients' migration across regions: the case of Italy (2004)The effects of cardiac specialty hospitals on the cost and quality of medical care (2005)Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1981)Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition (1983)Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition (1983)Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition (1992)Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition (1992)The Architecture of Government (2007)Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation (1975)Hospital response to prospective payment: Moral hazard, selection, and practice-style effects (1996)Competition and Quality: Evidence From the Nhs Internal Market 1991–9 (2007)Health Disparities and Health Equity: The Issue Is Justice (2011)Swedish experience-based value sets for EQ-5D health states (2013)End-stage renal disease and economic incentives: the International Study of Health Care Organization and Financing (ISHCOF) (2007)Quality competition with profit constraints (2012)
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References

  • 1985A Theory of Yardstick Competition1,428 cited
  • 2001Handbook of Health Economics933 cited
  • 1986Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement724 cited
  • 1998Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins482 cited
  • 1994H ealth C are P ayment S ystems : C ost and Q uality I ncentives367 cited
  • 1998Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality330 cited
  • 1990Optimal payment systems for health services321 cited
  • 2004Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment181 cited
  • 1998Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality179 cited
  • 2000Chapter 15 Government purchasing of health services175 cited
  • 2004Purchasing health care services from providers with unknown altruism140 cited
  • 1997Hospital Reimbursement Incentives: An Empirical Analysis140 cited
  • 1989Hospital nonprice competition and medicare reimbursement policy117 cited
  • 2003Cream-skimming, incentives for efficiency and payment system83 cited
  • 2000Hospital response to DRG refinements: the impact of multiple reimbursement incentives on inpatient length of stay71 cited

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  • 2006Incentive-compatible guaranteed renewable health insurance premiums65 cited
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