Adaptive agents in a persistent shout double auction

Abstract

CIiff [7J has demonstrated that simple, adaptive agents are able to trade in a form of double auction marketplace, in such a way that trade prices converge towards the equilibrium price of the marketplace.However, the marketplace within which the agents trade is unrealistic.In this paper, we consider a more realiitic form of double auction marke~thepersistent shout double auction.We present agents based on the ZIP agents of (Xi [7J, but with an alternative set of heuristics for use within this auction.We demonstrate that the resulting agents achieve equilibrium signifkantly faster than ZIP agents do, maintain a more stable equilibrium, and are more robust to changes in learning rate. 1.1

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