Negotiation and Noncooperation: Debating Michigan's Conditional Land Transfer Agreement

Abstract

Local governments in Michigan have at their disposal a mechanism for cooperation on land transfer. Through the Conditional Land Transfer Act (P.A. 42 5 of 1984), local governments negotiate shared jurisdiction for a piece of property for a set period of time for the purpose of econom ic development (Taylor, Harvey, and Shields 2004; Bassett 2006; Harvey and Qui?ones 1996). Like annexation, conditional land trans fer agreements, popularly known as P.A. 425 agreements, can be used to permanently transfer land from one jurisdiction to another. Unlike in annexation, jurisdictions negotiate conditions for the property, includ ing property tax sharing and negotiated provi sion of urban services. Michigan has a strong tradition of township government (Browne and VerBurg 1995, 300; Stephens 1989), and township officials often resist annexation ef forts. Townships are frequently cast as the losers in annexation battles while cities gain territory, expand their tax bases, and impose their land-use preferences. Conditional land transfer agreements provide an opportunity for cities and townships to negotiate these tensions. Understanding the negotiation of conditional land transfers is important because the use of these agreements has increased over time (Taylor, Harvey, and Shields 2004). This study asks two questions about the negotia tion process: Do existing intergovernmental connections in other policy areas foster the development of conditional land transfers, and is land use identified as a critical point of discussion in successful and unsuccessful

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