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Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
7 references·1 citing·26 second hop
Manipulability measures of common social choice functions (1999)Manipulability measures of common social …A Political Theory Primer (2020)A Political Theory PrimerAlmost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't (1993)Almost all social choice rule…Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control (1985)Sophisticated voting outcomes…A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting: Further Graph- Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting (1980)A New Solution Set for Tourna…Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Strategy-proofness and Arrow'…Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Manipulation of Voting Scheme…Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Social Choice and Individual …Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules (2006)Some Further Results on the M…The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation (2002)Strategy-proof Social Choice (2010)Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles (1976)Strategy and group choice (1978)An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes (1995)Theory of voting (1969)General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models (1979)Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models (1979)Choosing from a tournament (1986)Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote (1994)Chapter 4 Voting procedures (2002)Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control (1976)Condorcet Social Choice Functions (1977)Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions (1984)How hard is it to control an election? (1992)A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice (2000)A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS? (1991)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Well-being : the foundations of hedonic psychology (1999)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Agent discretion, regulatory policymaking, and different institutional arrangements (1996)Agents and Structures: Two Views of Preferences, Two Views of Institutions (1998)Cultural Value (2014)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1951Social Choice and Individual Values.7,792 cited
  • 1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result3,211 cited
  • 1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions2,821 cited
  • 1980A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting: Further Graph- Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting481 cited
  • 1985Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control290 cited
  • 1993Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't85 cited
  • 2020A Political Theory Primer82 cited

Cited by

  • 2006Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules59 cited

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