Wealth and Executive Compensation

Bo Becker

137 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Finance

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Corporate Finance and Governance Labor market dynamics and wage inequality Accounting and Organizational Management

Abstract

ABSTRACT Using new data on the wealth of Swedish CEOs, I show that higher wealth CEOs receive stronger incentives. Since high wealth (excluding own‐firm holdings) implies low absolute risk aversion, this is consistent with a risk aversion explanation. To examine whether wealth is likely to proxy for power, I use lagged wealth (typically measured before the CEO was hired), and the results remain for one of two incentive measures. Also, the wealth–incentive result is not stronger for CEOs likely to face limited owner oversight. Finally, wealth is unrelated to pay levels, and is hence unlikely to proxy for skill.

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References

1979Moral Hazard and Observability 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design 1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives 1999The Provision of Incentives in Firms 1989Handbook of Labor Economics 1985Corporate performance and managerial remuneration 2001Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are 1998Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?

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