The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Political Economy of Hedge Fund Regulation in the European Union

Abstract

This article assesses the ‘old’ and ‘new’ political economy of hedge fund regulation in the EU, explaining why the EU has decided to regulate hedge fund managers in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. A Franco-German alliance, with the support of Italy, other Mediterranean countries and some quarters of the European Parliament, has driven the EU's attempt to regulate hedge funds. The new EU rules are explained by institutionally-shaped economic interests rooted in national varieties of financial capitalism – the ‘old’ political economy of hedge fund regulation. However, ‘ideas’, in the form of competing regulatory paradigms, are instrumental in explaining why one coalition of actors has prevailed over the other in EU rule-making – the ‘new’ political economy of hedge fund regulation.

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