Deceitful behaviors of alliance partners: potential and prevention

Abstract

Purpose To provide decision makers in strategic alliances a risk‐time framework to: categorize types of potential deceitful behaviors by partners; and adopt appropriate deterrence mechanisms to curb and control such behavior. Design/methodology/approach The article identifies four types of deceitful behavior, based on: the degree of relational risk that characterizes interactions of a firm with its alliance partner; and the length of the deceit horizon. Findings Suggests a number of deterrence mechanisms for controlling the different types of deceitful behavior, with the aim of enhancing confidence in partner cooperation in alliances. Practical implications The article provides a practical template for alliance managers to decide what kinds of deterrence mechanisms to adopt on the basis of the type of perceived deceitful behavior of alliance partners. Originality/value The article responds to an unmet need of managers with alliance responsibilities for a framework to help select the most effective mechanisms to deter different kinds of potential deceitful behavior of alliance partners.

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