Praising Civil Service but Not Bureaucracy

Abstract

Public administration writers contend that because career executives have greater competence, the U.S. federal executive has too many political appointees. The author argues that opposition to more political appointees is based on misconceptions about both the political and career personnel systems of the modern federal civil service. The increased controversy of government policies since the 1960s and the concordant growth of the politics industry in Washington have increased demands for relatively high-risk political work in the executive branch. Furthermore, the state of the merit system does not suggest that extending that system to higher level positions would lead to a more effective or efficient civil service.

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