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Rational requirements and ‘rational’ akrasia
16 references·0 citing·32 second hop
Rational requirements and ‘rational’ akrasia (2012)Rational requirements and ‘rational’ akra…Authority and Estrangement (2012)Authority and EstrangementWhy Be Rational? (2005)Why Be Rational?Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency (2004)Unprincipled virtue: an inqui…Reasons (2004)ReasonsReason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz (2004)Reason and Value: Themes From…Philosophy and the Emotions (2003)Philosophy and the EmotionsAuthority and Estrangement (2002)Authority and EstrangementNormativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason (2001)Normativity, Commitment, and …Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values? (2001)Are Intentions Reasons? And H…What We Owe to Each Other (2000)What We Owe to Each OtherOn Acting Rationally against One's Best Judgment (2000)On Acting Rationally against …Normative Requirements (1999)Normative RequirementsIntention, Plans, and Practical Reason. (1991)Intention, Plans, and Practic…Identity, Character, and Morality (1990)Identity, Character, and Mora…The importance of what we care about (1982)The importance of what we car…The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn (1974)The Conscience of Huckleberry…The Moral Problem (1994)The Sources of Normativity (1996)Against Content Normativity (2009)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence (2015)Acting for the Right Reasons (2010)Why Things Matter to People: Social Science, Values and Ethical Life (2011)Against autonomy: justifying coercive paternalism (2013)Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism (2005)Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice (2005)Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger (2013)Goal constructs in psychology: Structure, process, and content. (1996)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory (2011)Intentional social action in virtual communities (2002)The Moral Significance of Class (2005)Appraisal Theories of Emotion: State of the Art and Future Development (2013)Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion (2003)Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation (2007)The Scarecrow and the Tin Man: The Vicissitudes of Human Sympathy and Caring (2007)Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy (2001)A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value (2005)Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment (2020)Burdened Virtues (2005)Analyzing Oppression (2006)Lying and Deception (2010)What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? (2004)The Nature of Normativity (2007)The Philosophy of Sociality (2007)Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?1 (2005)Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning (2015)Reasons First (2021)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2000What We Owe to Each Other3,491 cited
  • 1991Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.2,383 cited
  • 1982The importance of what we care about1,097 cited
  • 2002Authority and Estrangement894 cited
  • 1999Normative Requirements803 cited
  • 2004Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency776 cited
  • 2005Why Be Rational?708 cited
  • 1974The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn472 cited
  • 1990Identity, Character, and Morality412 cited
  • 2004Reasons333 cited
  • 2004Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz310 cited
  • 2000On Acting Rationally against One's Best Judgment292 cited
  • 2001Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values?234 cited
  • 2012Authority and Estrangement203 cited
  • 2001Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason171 cited
  • 2003Philosophy and the Emotions170 cited

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